The challenges faced by Britain in the post-Brexit referendum era are as varied as they are complex and intertwined, but not all of them have been sparked entirely by the decision to leave the EU. In many cases, the Brexit vote has in fact shone a spotlight on already existing issues, bringing them to the fore and forcing the UK to confront the issue head-on. The dilemma now facing British defence strategy is one such that has been brewing since 1945, and now requires urgent attention.
As a member of the European Union, Britain has repeatedly used its veto to stop plans for an ‘EU army’, or any closer integration of a collaborative military framework between member states outside the structure of NATO. Brexit means losing this veto, and the European Union has been quick to act. On 11 September, the defence ministers of Germany and France (Ursula von der Leyen and Jean-Yves Le Drian) outlined a new framework for closer EU defence collaboration, including proposals for a permanent joint military HQ instead of rotational command by EU states and swifter deployment for overseas missions.
These plans were relatively well received by the other member states at the Bratislava summit on 16 September (at which Britain was conspicuously absent). From the EU’s point of view, this allows them to address their embarrassing impotence in the face of the Ukraine crisis, where despite the crisis happening right on the EU’s doorstep, it was the US that reassured eastern European NATO allies by deploying military hardware.
But from Britain’s point of view these plans pose a greater problem. The British veto of EU military integration had partly been due to the view that this would bring the EU one step closer to a “United States of Europe”, but this point is relatively moot for Britain post-Brexit. The greater problem is that Britain fears that closer EU military collaboration and integration undermines the position of NATO in Europe, thus encouraging the US to reduce its engagement in Europe, and by extension with Britain. For all Donald Trump’s bluster and factual inaccuracies, his comments regarding NATO in Europe highlight a genuine feeling in the US that America has bigger concerns elsewhere (notably South East Asia), and that Europe should be left to handle its own security issues.
This prospect is unwelcome for Britain’s defence strategy, in which NATO and a strong American presence in Europe and at Britain’s side has been a central pillar since the end of the Second World War. Since 1945, Britain has not had military self-sufficiency in defence, and has instead relied on the US and NATO to be its guarantors of security. US support has not always been forthcoming for all of Britain’s military adventures – America was pointedly unsupportive of Britain’s imperial role, and most famously refused to assist Anthony Eden in his attempt to take back control of the Suez Canal in 1956. But in matters of defence at home and in Europe, Britain has been able to rely on US power to guarantee its security. This remains the case today, as cyber-threats, international terrorism and Russian posturing in Europe pose real and current security threats to the UK.
The American presence in Europe since 1945 is, however, something of an anomaly: for most of its history America has been unenthusiastic about participating in European affairs, as demonstrated by its isolationist policies of the early 20th Century and initial reluctance to get involved in the Second World War. However, the peace arrangements after WW2, with the partition of Germany into military zones, embroiled America in Europe and guaranteed its continued presence throughout the subsequent Cold War.
Following the end of the Cold War, some in the US have urged a return to the country’s traditional stance, and while adherence to NATO remains national policy in Washington, the US has definitely begun to disengage from Europe, both in the national mindset and in more concrete fashion by withdrawing its troops, developments which have threatened the British reliance on US military power as a central pillar of its overall defence strategy. Hence the rise of ‘special relationship’ rhetoric and enthusiastic British support of the Iraq War, with the aim of strengthening the alliance with the US and reminding the US of the importance of Britain and Europe. In Afghanistan British forces engaged in Helmand, one of the most violent and dangerous theatres of conflict, to demonstrate the level of commitment to the UK’s alliance with the US and NATO.
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that Britain has one of the highest levels of support for NATO of all the member nations and crucially ahead of that in Germany, the US and France (see chart below). France has never been an enthusiastic member of what they see primarily as an Anglo-American alliance, and many in post-unification Germany view NATO as mainly a Cold War institution.
Notably, Germany and France, in contrast with Britain, opposed the Iraq war, and at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, both opposed admitting Georgia and Ukraine to NATO, giving the reason that doing so would unduly antagonise Russia. It is clear that Germany and France do not share Britain’s vision of the centrality of NATO and the US military might to European security, and now that the British veto has been withdrawn, the EU can go ahead with its plans for military self-sufficiency.
Interestingly, one other effect of Brexit is that the resulting economic uncertainty in Europe has jeopardised European defence spending. This is particularly disappointing for NATO since, as recently as May 2016, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg indicated that an increase in NATO European defence spending could be expected in 2016 for the first time since the end of the 1980s. As a result, US commitment to Europe risks being further diminished.
Where does this leave Britain? If the role of NATO and by extension the US is diminished in Europe, the UK would find itself relying more on its European allies for military support. There are a number of problems with this, the most obvious being that sentiment in Germany and France following Brexit is likely to be considerably less favourable towards British interests.
In addition, the inefficiency of an EU defence framework compared to the US is potentially a serious drawback. Regardless of the actual combined military strength of the EU nations, the inter-state nature of the EU builds in inevitable inefficiencies and duplications. Strategic decisions will have to be ratified by member states (including some which are officially neutral), and the ratio of national bureaucracy to actual troop numbers will be higher than in the US which only has one set of national bureaucratic offices compared to the EU’s multiple nations.
The defence dilemma posed by EU military integration, viz that in strengthening European defence capabilities (itself on the surface not an undesirable outcome) it may at the same time undermine NATO and US engagement in Europe, is not a new one. But it has been brought to the fore by the UK’s decision to leave the EU and, now that Britain can no longer prevent it, it has been given a new urgency for Britain’s strategic policymakers.
The security threats that Britain faces from international terrorism, cyber threats, and Russian posturing in Europe necessitate a robust UK defence strategy. At the moment, NATO as currently constituted and a strong US presence in Europe is central to this. If as a result of the country’s departure from the EU that changes and the NATO shield becomes less complete or less reliable, it will be yet one more unexpected consequence of the referendum decision last June.