The UK’s referendum campaign begins

The date has now been set, and the opposing camps are beginning to campaign in earnest.  Compared to the US electoral process, where the next presidential campaign seems to start almost as soon as the previous presidential election is over, or more relevantly the Scottish Independence referendum campaign, which was fully 2 years long, the 4 months between now and 23 June, when the UK electorate will vote on whether or not to retain the country’s membership of the EU, is actually quite a short time.  But it is more than long enough for the British people to be subjected to acres of newsprint and millions of words, many of them no doubt little more than preaching to the converted.

And the structures of the two campaigns are already becoming clear.  Since the shape of a future life outside the EU is largely unknown, and the actual process of leaving the EU is totally unknown, the two camps are very largely focussing on unsubstantiated (and unprovable) claims for the merits of their cause and warnings of dire consequences of their opponents’.  Those who want the UK to remain in the EU have been accused of running “Project Fear”, spreading stories of catastrophe and calamity if the UK were to leave, while those who would rather the UK left are accused of ignoring reality and seeing everything through the rosiest of rose-tinted spectacles.

We do not intend to follow either of these courses.  We prefer to stick to what we actually observe, and importantly we choose to consider what others outside the UK observe and think as well.  And in this first essay of what will no doubt be a series, we will focus on just four factors.

Firstly, the question in front of the UK electorate is not whether they think the EU is perfect, or whether they approve of the way it is run.  Rather, it is whether it is in the national interest to remain a member, or whether on balance it serves the national interest more to leave, and moreover to leave now, within the time frame of this parliament.

It is quite possible to hold the view that the EU is a mess, that its governance is not fit for purpose, that its democratic credentials are extremely weak, that its bureaucracy meddles unnecessarily in national affairs, that too much of its monetary resources are wasted if not subject to corruption, that its single currency is a mistake that is causing huge damage to southern Europe and that its foreign policy is a disaster.  Many in the UK would agree with all of these points, and we have expressed most if not all of these views ourselves in previous essays over the years.  Many in the rest of the EU would agree with them as well.  But these are not the issues at stake in the referendum.

It is also possible to hold the view that if the UK was not a member, it would not, and should not, even consider joining now.  Fewer in the rest of the EU would agree with that;  but equally, it is not the issue at stake in the referendum.

Rather, the issue is whether the UK’s national interest is best served by walking away from the EU.  That is a much higher hurdle than the question of whether or not the EU is on balance good for the country.  It is possible to agree with all of the criticisms above – as we have observed, most other countries in the EU would have much sympathy with all of them – and yet to feel that the correct response is to try and improve the EU, to work with its strengths and try to correct its shortcomings.

It is a peculiar British conceit that only the UK can see the failings in the EU.  The truth is that only the British cannot see its strengths, and do not want to try to build on the bits that work rather than hammer at the bits that don’t.

The second point we would observe is that the EU will still exist the day after the UK leaves.  It will still be the UK’s nearest geographical landmass, the country’s largest economic partner and an essential component of its national security.  It will however be weakened both politically and economically, it will quite possibly be resentful and angry, and it will owe the UK nothing at all.  But the UK will not be able to avoid it or ignore it.  Indeed, if many do not like the EU at the moment when it is made up of countries that are at least nominally the UK’s partners, they may have a nasty shock when they meet an EU which is indifferent or worse to the effect of its policies on London.

And this leads to the third point we would make, which is that actually negotiating the UK’s departure will be extremely difficult.  If Cameron has found the negotiations over the “package to stay” difficult over the last few days, it is nothing to the challenge that will face the luckless team tasked with negotiating the UK’s “package to leave”.  The EU’s treaties specify a period of 2 years in which a country that has signified its intention to leave is “in the exit room” – still a member, but negotiating the terms of the divorce.  At the end of those two years, the country is no longer a member whether or not new terms have been agreed.  And if terms have not been agreed, then the relationship between the departing member and the rest of the EU is as that between strangers:  no trade treaties, no taxation treaties, no rights for its citizens living in the remaining EU.

We have met no-one, no-one at all, who thinks that satisfactory terms of engagement between the departing UK and the rest of the EU can be concluded in 2 years.  The figure of 2 years was set in the initial treaties, when the EU was the EEC and the ties that bound members to each other were a fraction what they are now.   Even if the EU had nothing else to occupy its bureaucrats (which is certainly not the case) and even if the UK had a crack team of trade negotiators (which it doesn’t;  the country has not negotiated a trade deal for itself since it joined the EU over 40 years ago), the two years is totally inadequate.

Just as a reality check, Switzerland – the example often pointed to for how to do business with the EU while not a member – started negotiating its trade treaties with the then EEC in 1960, yet even after 55 years of bilateral hard work the Swiss are not entirely happy with the terms of their trade with the EU and are continually refining them.

It is quite possible that there is a steady state for the UK in which life outside the EU would be entirely acceptable.  But one does need to be able to reach that steady state:  it is not enough for being outside the EU to work, the country also has to get there.

But we do not have to examine the future, and the what-ifs, to try to determine the best course.  We can also see what others think now, today, that the country should do.  And here the message is very clear.

The UK’s partners in the EU want the UK to remain a member.  The country’s NATO partners want the UK to remain a member.  Most of the Commonwealth who have expressed a view (Canada, Australia and so on) want the UK to remain a member.  The US wants the UK to remain a member.  About the only people who would benefit from a UK departure would be those who wish the EU ill, such as Russia or Islamic State.

This then is our fourth point.  When all the UK’s friends counsel a course of action, when they would be materially damaged if the UK chose otherwise, when the only people to benefit will be those who oppose everything the democratic West stands for, the burden of proof for those who want to leave becomes extraordinarily high.

It is against this backdrop that we will explore and analyse the referendum campaign in the months to come.