Schengen under Stress: Solidarité, or Désunion?

The mass murder of innocent civilians in Paris on 13 November prompted a global outpouring of sympathy and support for Parisians, and solidarity in the face of terrorism. Nations of the entire world were perhaps more united over the issue than any other in recent history. At the United Nations, resolution UNSCR 2249, calling on member states to use “all necessary measures” to prevent and suppress terrorist activity on territory under the control of the group known as ISIS, was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council. Chinese president Xi Jinping offered China’s support to France in the fight against terrorism. There was even talk of burying the hatchet with Russia and co-operating over military action in Syria, which would have been unthinkable just a few months ago.

Perhaps even more meaningful than all this was the genuine outpouring of support from people all over the world for the Parisians, exhibited on social media, public buildings, vigils and the historic singing of La Marseillaise at Wembley Stadium.

However, while binding Europe and the world together against the common enemy of terrorism, the Paris attacks have also sowed seeds of disunity over one of the EU’s central pillars, the Schengen Agreement. The Agreement provides that people may pass without passport controls or border checks between 22 of the 28 countries of the EU, and a few others such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland.

Even before the attacks, this principle of free movement was under strain. The Syrian refugee crisis was causing problems as individual states of the EU struggled to accommodate and provide for the influx of migrants, an area in which they felt the Schengen Agreement left them powerless. The passing through of refugees on their way to northern states such as Germany and Sweden was enough to make several southern states erect physical barriers and fences along their borders. Even so, the feeling prevailed that this was a slow-burning problem which could be managed, if the EU could provide the right leadership and adequate resources. But the Paris attacks, if handled badly, could in a worst case scenario be the straws that broke the camel’s back and bring the Schengen Agreement to an end completely.

This is despite the fact that the blame for the Paris attacks lies entirely with the attackers and not the policies of the Schengen Area. Almost all of the attackers were French or Belgian citizens, and so unlikely to have been prevented from crossing intra-EU borders even if full border checks had been in place (a passport found at the scene that implied that attackers entered Europe through the refugee stream was possibly fake and almost certainly planted deliberately). However it is seldom hard facts such as these that define political outcomes. Instead, it is the decisions of those in power – reacting in turn to nervous electorates – that will decide the future of the Schengen Area.

The risks of the Schengen Area’s policy of open internal borders were initially perceived as  economic risk arising from uncontrolled movement of labour, and then as more of a socio-economic risk arising from the movement of migrants. Now in several areas of Europe, it is being perceived as a direct security threat. French president François Hollande’s precaution of re-installing border controls in immediate response to the Paris attacks, which was understandable as an attempt to prevent the escape of the attackers and a precaution against further attacks, is also a clear manifestation of France’s wider unease about the free movement of people around Europe. It is unlikely that France’s border controls will be lifted any time soon.

And France is not the only member state to have doubts. Konrad Szymanski, Poland’s newly-elected minister for European Affairs, has said that Poland’s new government would not honour the agreement made by the previous government on refugees and would refuse to accept migrant quotas imposed by the European Union. Instead, Szymanski wants Poland to keep full control of its borders.

This seriously undermines the principles of the Schengen Area, as it treats the agreement as a luxury to be discarded at times of crisis instead of a central pillar of the EU and a key factor in defending against crisis. This is not to be taken lightly, although it is not the first time such a central EU principle has been temporarily lifted. In March 2013, the free movement of capital was suspended between Cyprus and the rest of the Eurozone to isolate the Cypriot banking system when it was under great pressure, leading to a two-tier Eurozone while the Cypriot authorities tackled their financial crisis.

The last of the capital controls on the Cypriot financial system, which were meant to last “a few weeks”, were only finally lifted in April of this year, more than 2 years after their imposition.

The reaction to the Paris attacks across Europe reveals the primary problem of the Schengen Area, which lies not in its internal borders but in the external border where the Schengen Area meets the rest of the world. The Paris attacks highlighted that participating Schengen countries have surrendered control over who enters their territory not to an agency in Brussels, where there are good opportunities for political engagement, but to the national authorities of those member states on the edge of the common area. Who can enter France is no longer decided in Paris, or even Brussels, but at the massively overladen border crossings in southern Europe, which are bearing the brunt of refugees desperate to escape the crisis in Syria.

This fact, while not necessarily a fatal flaw in itself, is compounded by the serious lack of trust and coordination between Europe’s national border agencies, and a lack of routine information sharing in Europe. One unnamed Brussels-based diplomat warned that “We have open borders but not open information”, resulting in an incomplete frontline defence for Europe. When faced with the violence wished upon Europe’s people and its values by ISIS, it is unsurprising that member states feel vulnerable given their lack of control over their borders.

The mass murders in Paris may not have been a direct result of Schengen Area policies, but they have sparked a sharp turn towards heightened security in Europe, and will continue to do so. While members of the public “on the ground” wave French flags and demonstrate their solidarity, it is likely that other leaders will follow Poland and France in demanding more sovereignty over their borders. At the very least, there will be calls for better controls over the Schengen Area’s internal borders and the movement of people. If this is badly handled it will be a source of disunity in Europe as member states view their borders and neighbours with suspicion, and in a worst case scenario could be the final nail in the coffin for the Schengen Area. This in turn would be an enormous blow for the European project, since the agreement is such a central principle of European co-operation and community.

Europe’s political leaders must act fast if they are to save their dream of a Union without internal borders. It will require dramatically improving co-operation among participating countries and relevant agencies and increasing the sharing of information. Additionally, the creation of a new Union-wide border agency and border control force, with a federal-style structure and management, will have to be considered as a very high priority. This could possibly allay the security fears of European citizens and enable the EU’s leaders to present a robust argument in favour of maintaining the Schengen Agreement.

But to win the argument outright means solving the much larger problem of why a small but devastating number of Europe’s citizens are turning against their fellow citizens and against the society that has given them a home. And that still seems to be a long way off.